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Central America is no longer the contentious issue that it was during the 
Reagan/Sandinista era. The Cold War is over. Without the key geo-strategic 
dimension ensuing from the superpowers' confrontation, Central America took a 
dive in the chancelleries of me North's list of priorities. This shift has had mixed 
consequences for die region. Among die most beneficial has been the de-escalation 
of internal conflict and foreign intervention in El Salvador and Nicaragua, particu-
larly its military variant. Thus the central requirement of die 1987 Arias plan has 
been fully implemented. Conversely, this de-escalation also means mat after an 
extraordinary fifteen year break, the region will sink again into international 
oblivion, at die very moment when financial support and political pressures from die 
world community are as badly needed as ever. 
Academia is also affected by die fading manichean prism of the 1980s. The 
political pilgrims crowd is wearing min in local hotels and pensioners, while NGO 
staffs - most being committed to bettering me people's lot, not, like the former, to 
worshiping contondantes - are kept afloat by the declining but still sizeable inflow 
of reconstruction money. Scholars are quietly sneaking into otiier field/research 
areas, where fresh money could be found - for lack of omer non-material incentives. 
And yet, the actual process of democratization in the region is in many ways 
more intellectually-challenging man me Cold War past. El Salvador now provides 
a unique example of successful overall transition, from a war-torn and largely 
undemocratic country to a land of relatively peaceful political competition and 
democratization. To uproot a long legacy of autiioritarianism, sectarianism and 
violence, epitomized during die 1980-92 internal war, El Salvador has been 
banking, in die past tiiree years, on extraordinary bilateral, multilateral and 
international support from North American and European countries, the UN and 
interamerican organizations, and coundess NGOs. Born the UN Secretary General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali and the Bush administration brought the belligerents to the 
negotiating table in 1990, the former eventually becoming, at the belligerents' 
request, increasingly involved in die negotiation. Then, die Secretary General and 
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the El Salvador-based UN Commission for El Salvador (ONUSAL) contributed 
decisively to drafting, financing (or raising funds), even prescribing plans for 
demilitarization, land transfer and democratization of political institutions. Though 
the process could still be derailed by continuing death-squad activities, the pros-
pects remain rather encouraging. In Guatemala, talks between the Guatemalan 
National Revolutionary Unity and the new government of President Ramiro de 
Leon Carpio have yet to gain momentum, but the probability of a major break-
through is higher than ever. Previously, an elected president (Jorge Serrano) 
attempted to wage an auto-coup (following President Fujimori in Peru), but his 
venture was unanimously rejected by both the civil society, which came out strongly 
and united against die would-be dictator, and the US government. Nicaragua, on 
die orner hand, is engulfing itself in an unprecedented vortex of chaos, suffering and 
violence. We are witnessing die implosion of virtually all institutions in the country. 
The Sandinistas, for all their internal bickering, remain me strongest single political 
organization in the country. However, by constantly straddling me line between 
legality and illegality, respecting die constitution one day and threatening to rule 
from below die next (very much like me pre-Menem Peronists in Argentina), die 
Sandinistas are contributing to die lingering instability mat prevents a real recon-
struction from taking place. The omer parties are little more man fig leaves for 
cabals of intriguers and would-be caudillos, whose very existence seems to prevent 
die emergence of a strong and unified alternative to die Sandinistas. Finally, though 
enjoying some level of credibility and legitimacy, domestically and abroad, me 
Chamorro-Lacayo team is pushing a drastic reconstruction plan which, in die 
absence of a meaningful political pact truly respected by the main actors, brings 
little more man misery to die masses. In Nicaragua, land of excommunication and 
pilgrimages for a decade, ideology is no longer die main underpinning factor of 
instability and polarization: former contras (re-contras) and ex-Sandinistas (re-
compas) have at times united for armed operations (me revueltos) against die 
government of bom Violeta Chamorro and Humberto Ortega! Finally, Costa Rica, 
for all its economic difficulties, has continued on its extraordinary democratic path, 
while Honduras is managing to survive in a mix of post-oligarchic, highly depend-
ent, and quasi-civilian rule. 
Needless to say, problems of poverty, corruption, social injustice and 
underdevelopment still plague die region. Internal wars have wrought even more 
poverty and suffering to bom me Nicaraguan and die Salvadoran poor. Military 
officers, except in Costa Rica, still exert a veto power on policies and remain largely 
beyond me law. Nevertheless, civilian leaders have been brought to power, eitiier 
through relatively honest electoral contests, or, in the special case of Guatemala, 
through a popularly acclaimed parliamentary nomination. Violeta Chamorro is no 
Somoza, Carpio Leon is no Rios Monti, Cristiani is no D'Aubuisson, and Bill 
Clinton is no Ronald Reagan. 
For an understanding of die current transition in Central America, scholars 
now have access to a growing body of literature. Most of mem having been written 
in the 1980s, are mosdy engagé, sympametic to die Central American revolution, 
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and hostile to US policy in the region. In the US, Central America rapidly became 
an obvious case study where Yankee imperialism could be unveiled and denounced. 
One finds no shortage of indicators of Uncle Sam's arrogance, brutality, unlawful 
interference, bribery, violation of international law; and this, since long before the 
1980s. But in the last decade, the "Great Satan" was matched by true revolution-
aries, fighting to establish a "New Society," so the stage was set for an historical 
confrontation between "Right and Wrong." A striking example of this type of work 
is to be found in Thomas Walker's edited volume Revolution and Counterrevolution 
in Nicaragua. Walker has a tremendous advantage over most other specialists of 
this country: his scholarly interest in Nicaragua started years before the Sandinistas 
seized power in 1979. So his early work, as he recalls, made him "by default, one 
of only a handful of U.S. specialists on Nicaragua at the time." (p. ix) During die 
1980s, he was virtually the owner of Nicaragua in the Latin American Studies 
Association (US), presiding over the Task Force on Nicaragua and organizing 
political pilgrims in the land of Sandino. It is fair to say that Walker is passionately 
pro-Sandinista, and no less passionately anti-US policy in die region and beyond. 
If the essays edited in Walker's book are generally well-documented, informative 
and easily accessible, most are inordinately uncritical of the Sandinista record. The 
Sandinistas are apparently more eager to admit mistakes. Last summer, this 
reviewer saw Tomas Borge, former minister of Interior and founding father of the 
FSLN, explaining quietly on TV that die dynamic of mass participation under die 
Sandinistas was too "vertical" (meaning die orders were coming from above), tiiat 
errors were committed against the Miskitos, and mat die economy was poorly 
managed. The Sandinistas have to be commended for dieir willingness to admit 
mistakes, and adapt to new realities. But their "gringo" admirers, (who comprise 
die majority in this volume), most of whom would have preferred a much more 
radical regime in Nicaragua, just don't want anybody breaking dieir toy, not even 
die Sandinistas, who from 1988 to dieir electoral defeat in 1990, proved to be not 
sufficientiy Sandinista. 
Therefore, it comes as no surprise mat me only two chapters in Walker's 
Revolution and Counterrevolution diat are not frantically apologetical are written 
by non-gringos! They stand out for dieir sympathetic but honesüy critical and calm 
assessment of the Sandinista record. The "Agrarian Reform" is analyzed by 
Eduardo Baumeister (an Argentine sociologist), starting with a balanced and 
original description of the "inherited structure" of production and social relations 
in the countryside during die 1970s. Then, he highlights die reform's achievements 
in me early 1980s (43% of all peasant families receiving lands), but also its 
shortcomings: essentially, "agrarian policy mat was excessively centered on state 
farms, state control of commerce, and die auuioritarian methods of government 
technocrats had embittered relations between a segment of me peasantry and die 
revolution." (p. 243) This chapter has to be read not only by students of Nicaraguan 
politics, but also by whomever is looking for an efficient, fair, and progressive way 
of reforming die unjust and largely inoperative pattern of land-tenure in too many 
Latin American countries. Equally interesting is Luis Hector Sena's piece on 
65 
Winter 1994 
"Grass-Roots Organizations." Serra shows the low priority placed on these 
organizations by a highly centralized and omnipotent state, and unveils the 
"centralism and vertical structure of the FSLN." Again, in spite of the overall 
favorable assessment of the Sandinista experience, Serra does mention some 
"political errors of the government" (p. 64), thus enhancing his credibility in a book 
conceived as an act of war rather than as a truly academic instrument. 
The remaining chapters comprise a stunning apologia for the Sandinista 
government. One finds the occasional ideological twist, cover-up, or outright 
distortion committed by the authors to paint their heroes in the best possible light. 
In "The Evolution of Government Institutions," Andrew A. Reding maintains that 
non-Sandinista elements during the war against the Somoza dictatorship, and in the 
first Revolutionary Junta, were "nonrevolutionary forces." (p. 16) When after the 
triumph, the Sandinistas arbitrarily increased the number of seats anticipated for the 
new Council of State, so they could enjoy an automatic majority in this new body 
of "broad participation," they were merely "insist[ing] on a council that would more 
accurately reflect their popular support." (p. 17) Summary trials and execution of 
Somozistas, or presumed Somozistas, seem to have never occurred: "For the first 
time in the history of major social revolutions, the ancien régime was spared violent 
retribution." (p. 18) Reding's ebullience sometimes reaches Swiftian proportion: 
"[...] Sandinista marxists tended to set aside ideological orthodoxies in favor of a 
return to the empirical, more genuinely 'scientific,' method of Marx, deriving 
working hypotheses from the experience of efforts at revolutionary transforma-
tion." (p. 20) Likewise, though Sandinista leaders were probably not as greedy as 
their Central American or Mexican counterparts, one cannot understand why 
Michael Dodson (in "Religion and Revolution") has to proclaim that Sandinistas 
leaders espoused "ascetic, responsible lives and work hard" (p. 181)- especially 
after the infamous Pifiata.1 In keeping with this apologetic tone, Dodson's 
presentation of the conflict between the Miskito people and the Sandinista govern-
ment (1981-82) is a truly fantastic (in the sense used by Jorge L. Borges) exercise 
in absolving the revolutionary regime, to a point that Sandinistas themselves, now 
openly apologetic on this issue, would certainly find embarrassing, (pp. 174-75) In 
a chapter on "Human rights," Michael Linfield warns us in his introduction that 
from the standpoint of a country at war, Nicaragua's human rights 
recorded under the Sandinistas was in full compliance with the 
standards imposed by international human rights treaties. Its record 
on civil rights and civil liberties compared favorably with that of many 
Western European nations and even that of the United States in time 
of war. (p. 275) 
The purpose of this chapter is thereby to inform "gringo" readers that the violation 
of human rights was a non-issue in Sandinista Nicaragua. To make this case, the 
author formulates the distinction between "fundamental" and "secondary human 
rights." That proves salutary: what could appear as violations of the freedom of 
speech and association (censorship, persecution of non-violent opposition), or the 
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absence of due process of law (People's Anti-Somocista Tribunals) becomes 
"secondary" peccadillos, keeping untarnished the "fundamental" record "in time of 
war." (Of course, the idea that the war was in part a product of the early limitation 
of civil and political liberties is not explored here.) In international relations, some 
have been led to believe that Sandinistas and Soviet officials had a close relation-
ship, based on mutual interests and ideological affinities. Careful, warns Harry E. 
Vanden in a chapter discussing the Sandinistas' "Foreign policy": "Indeed, Soviet 
government officials were highly critical of the Nicaraguan economy (sic). Like-
wise, in private conversation, Sandinista leaders frequently criticized the Soviets 
for being unresponsive to popular needs and shackled by dogma." (p. 312 - emphasis 
added) The author recognizes that moderate Latin American countries who first 
supported Nicaragua grew disenchanted with the comandantes. The early Leninist 
orientation of the regime had little to do with this policy shift, needless to say. 
Instead, this was caused by the US, who launched "a cleverly orchestrated press 
campaign to discredit the Sandinistas." (p. 315) All in all, Nicaragua's foreign 
policy was nothing less than "fresh, unique, and independent." (p. 316) In a 
Chomskian essay on 'The U.S. Intervention in Nicaraguan and Other Latin 
American Media," Angharad N. Valdivia offers interesting insight on CIA involve-
ment in the media. Unfortunately, the case appears to be blown out of proportion, 
for the author's implicit assumption is that no genuine, autonomous and legitimate 
criticism of the Sandinistas was possible. True, "many Nicaraguans expressed their 
wishes that they could have a 'real' opposition newspaper, as it was obvious that La 
Prensa was extremely manipulated and full of half-truths." (p. 363) This chapter 
is pivotal to understanding a common mind-set in this book: for most of its 
contributors, criticism/opposition to Sandinistas from outside the Washington 
establishment or Wall Street - that is, not based on material interest - had to be 
caused by disinformation. The author of the chapter seems to regret that the 
Sandinista police could not control all the press agencies: "Although leading 
Sandinistas such as Tomas Borge and Ernesto Cardenal were acutely aware of the 
importance of the mass media system in a changing society, they were largely 
unable to control activities outside Nicaragua's borders. It was precisely from this 
arena that the counterrevolution operated." (p. 352) He then laments that "domes-
tically the Sandinistas exercised a bit more influence, but their control was by no 
means total." (p. 363) The Sandinista regime was neither hell nor heaven: 
hopefully, the 1990s will provide the kind of intellectual climate amenable to more 
balanced appraisals of its achievements and failures. 
Walter LaFeber's Inevitable Revolutions proposes a thorough investigation 
of United States policy in Central America. For all its qualities (well-researched, 
highly readable), the effort is based on simplistic assumptions and is constantly 
biased by the Cold War syndrome. The book reads like a chronological, journalistic 
critique of US foreign policy in Central America, from the nineteenth-century idea 
of "manifest destiny" to (in this new revised and expanded edition) the Iran-Contra 
scandal. In episode after episode, LaFeber adopts a common, rather basic assump-
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tion (for an historian): "Revolutions in such areas as Central America were 
inevitable." He continues: "The only choice was whether North Americans would 
work with those revolutionaries to achieve a more orderly and equitable society, or 
whether - as occurred in Guatemala and Nicaragua - Washington officials would 
try to cap the upheavals until the pressure built again to blow the societies apart with 
even greater force." (p. 16) 
In this book you get two Lafebers in one. First, there is LaFeber the 
conscientious historian who claims, for example, that "the motive for Washington's 
policy in Central America was not to stop upheavals, but to promote U.S. interests. 
[...] Interests and imperial rivalry, not morality and consistency, drove U.S. 
policies." (p. 39) This LaFeber is careful to highlight geo-strategic concerns as well 
as the relative autonomy of domestic actors in Central America. This allows him 
not to yield completely to deterministic explanations on the inevitability of Central 
American revolutions. Nevertheless, the story of US domination in Latin America 
is played forte. The pages on Honduras strike me as the most impressive, perhaps 
because little has been published on this country. For example, he explains that in 
the 1920s, "North American power had become so encompassing that U.S. military 
forces and United Fruit could struggle against each other to see who was to control 
the Honduran government, then have the argument settled by the U.S. Department 
of State." (p. 64) 
Then there is the other LaFeber, more opinionated, who too often sounds like 
he is preparing himself to rebuke Alexander Haig in some public debate. Proving 
that the most absurd and simplistic right wing assumptions (ie. the whole thing was 
cooked up by Moscow and La Havana) are bogus, LaFeber stretches on the other 
side and becomes the victim of his own parody. Hence, the Sandinista "economic 
team" is praised, through skillful use of quotations, for its "high quality." (p. 328) 
Yet, as noted earlier, if there is one thing the Sandinistas would readily admit, it is 
that they hardly knew how to manage a real economy after taking power.2 Violeta 
Chamorro and Alfonso Robelo resigned not because they had no power in a 
powerless Junta: instead, it was because the Sandinistas "had moved too far to the 
left." (p. 240) The Sandinistas had no choice but to entertain close relations with 
Moscow (p. 241), and did support self-determination in Afghanistan, though they 
were obviously right in "refusing to vote for a U.S.-sponsored U.N. resolution that 
condemned the Soviet invasion." (p. 237) An FMLN terrorist action - named 
"Yankee Aggressor, Another Vietnam Awaits you in El Salvador" (19 June 1985) 
- during which four US Marines, and eight innocent civilians were machine-gunned 
at a San Salvador café(an action condemned by human rights organizations and 
recently by the UN Commission of Truth) is referred to succinctly as a commend-
able military feat: "[...] the FMLN had extended its operations throughout the 
country and had even carried out raids in the capital of San Salvador that took the 
lives of U.S. military personnel." (p. 313) Setting aside the question of ideological 
bias, one also finds an astonishing hypothesis about the emergence of guerrilla 
groups in El Salvador, involving the oil embargo: "The repercussions of the 1973 
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oil embargo added to the crisis. An inflation rate of 60 percent in 1973 and 1974 
led desperate Salvadorans to join guerrilla groups that robbed banks and carried out 
bombings." (p. 244) 
In Inevitable Revolutions, the author's game-plan too often is to reproduce 
"sound bites" from his ideological enemy to build up his prosecution, and to nuance 
his heroes' shortcomings, while not moderating any of his critiques against his 
enemy. LaFeber is an accomplished historian, but too many of his assertions are 
hidden behind anonymous paraphrases, with no reference attached, from "an 
officer," a "key U.S. official," a "top army officer," "one participant" who "later 
recalled", etc. Sometimes one wonders if the author is actually quoting or 
interpreting (e.g. "William Bowdler and Assistant Secretary of State Vaky flew to 
San Salvador and asked Romero for at least cosmetic human rights reforms so 
Carter could resume sending assistance." [p. 247 - emphasis added]). 
In summary, though this book provides much information about US 
foreign policy in Central America, including some sound and welcomed critiques 
of American misdemeanours, his scholarly demonstration is plagued by a 
constant desire to win a political battle. Why does he have to be so partisan? Is 
it so difficult to write about revolutions without becoming a propagandist for one 
side or the other? 
Râfaga, the life Story of a Nicaraguan Miskito Comandante is the recon-
struction of Reynaldo Reyes Davis' life story (Râfaga is a nom de guerre), based 
on two years of face-to-face interviews, with the collaborative effort of J.K. Wilson 
and Tod Sloan and the approval of the council of Miskito elders. In contrast with 
the previously mentioned true believers, Râfaga hardly comes across as a model of 
political consistency. First he fought against Somoza in the Eastern front, along 
with "university kids who had gone from the classroom, the cinema, and the 
stadium to the jungle" and who "tired easily." He was sent to Cuba for three months 
in March 1978, and his "good relations" with the Sandinistas lasted until 1980. (p. 
35) Then he became a Contra, because the new revolutionary government was 
treating his people "like lower animals." In 1981-82, displacement of the East-
coast Indian population occurred, officially to protect the Indians from the fighting 
between the Sandinista and Contra forces along the Honduran border. According 
to his estimates (much higher than those usually cited), "probably between one 
thousand and fifteen hundred Miskito were killed [...] simply because they believed 
each one of us to be their enemy. But that was not true." (p. 58) Subsequently, he 
"gradually became disillusioned by the corruption of the leaders of the 'Contra' 
counterrevolution; and began to work for peace and autonomy through dialogue 
with the Nicaraguan government" (quoted from Tod Sloan's preface). He misses 
no occasion to slam the US, the Contra leadership in Miami, as well as Indian 
leaders such as Brooklyn Rivera, Steadman Fagoth, and Wycliffe Diego, who 
"have all been under the direction of outsiders." (p. 174) However, he does so for 
specific reasons (which may or may not be valid), not because he adheres to a rigid 
ideological game-plan. Finally, around the mid-1980s, he reconciled himself with 
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the Sandinistas, helping to create an organization amenable to dialogue with the 
government: KISAN (Kosta Atlantica Indians ka nani SutAslatakan Nicaragauza 
- Atlantic coast Indians united in Nicaragua). He accepted a "handsome gold and 
silver pistol" from Tomas Borge, then minister of Interior, and travelled anew to 
Cuba, along with some Miskito elders (who, unlike Râfaga, were totally misled by 
Castro's technique of hospitality). 
Ideological depth and coherence is replaced in his testimony by a sense of 
identity as a Miskito, coupled with the usual caudillo 's attributes: courage, loyalty 
to the men under his command and pragmatism. True, he sometimes indulges in 
self-laudatory recollections: about soldiers singing his praise and writing poems 
glorifying his courage (p. 63); nurses falling in love with him (p. 105); and some 
comparison between himself and Moses (p. 129); not to mention his wrestling 
exploits with alligators! (p. 179) His recollection might be a useful, though not an 
essential, addition to the meager material available on the Miskito Coast and, more 
generally, the Contras. Incidently, a top Sandinista official (Alejandro Bendana) 
recently published a book called Una tragedia campesina, testimonios de la 
resistencia (Managua, Editora de Arte, 1991), in which the former ambassador to 
Cuba explains that, though manipulated by the Yankees and deceived by former 
Somozistas, the Contra War was also a real peasant mobilization, revealing real 
peasant grievances. Does this mean that the US-sponsored Contra War was not 
solely an American creation? If this is true, then it is possible to appreciate in light 
of its intended objectives, how disastrous the American management of this popular 
discontent had been. Since the crusades seem to be over, this is one among many 
questions that could now be explored and debated in a scholarly way. Let us hope 
that the next decade will be one of peace, democracy and development for Central 
America, and also one of probably fewer but better publications on the complex 
problems that assail the region. 
Yvon Grenier 
St. Francis Xavier University. 
Endnotes 
1. Refers to the transition period from February to April 1990, when before leaving office, Sandinista 
leaders "treated" themselves with legal title to posh homes, luxury cars and ranches. 
2. See for example Alejandro Martinez Cuenca, Sandinista Economics in Practice, an Insider's 
Critical Reflections (Boston: South End Press, 1993). 
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